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APA-ADJUDICATION: IS THE QUEST FOR
UNIFORMITY FALTERING?
JEFFREY S. LUBBERS*
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE APA's ADJUDICATION PROVISIONS
As we pause to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA),1 it is well to hark back to its foundation-the
1941 Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure-and, not incidentally, to the contributions of its Staff Director,
Walter Gellhom.
One of the main reasons for the formation of the Committee was the
controversy over the lack of uniformity among agency hearing officers and
the perceived procedural unfairness of agency adjudication. As the
Committee's Report states, "Most of the controversy over administrative
procedure has centered around formal adjudication." 2 The Report went on
to describe the lack of uniformity that existed in 1941:
The methods of hedring and initial decision and the internal procedural structure
vary from agency to agency. In general, it has been customary to designate
hearing officers before whom evidence may be adduced-whether they be a board
of three or more individuals, or, as is more common, a single hearing officer,
variously known as a trial examiner, a referee, a presiding officer, a district
engineer, a deputy commissioner, or a register. These hearing officers have been
selected in various ways.
* Fellow in Administrative Law, Washington College of Law, The American
University; B.A., Cornell University, J.D., University of Chicago Law School. Formerly
Research Director of the Administrative Conference of the U.S. (1982-1995).
1. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§
551-59, 701-06).
2. Attorney General's Comm. on Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies,
S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1941) [hereinafter Attorney General's Comm.
Report].
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No less varied is the weight attached by the several agencies to the judgments of
those who conduct the hearings. In most of the agencies the person who presides
is an adviser with no real power to decide.
Even in the common situation where a hearing officer is without real power to
decide, his duties and powers vary considerably.
Just as there is variation in the part played by the hearing officer in the process of
deciding, so the agencies differ in their choice of methods of reaching the ultimate
decision. "3
This led the Committee to conclude that:
[W]here agencies have recognized the importance of hearing officers in the salaries
paid. in the independence of view encouraged and accorded, and in the importance
given to their decisions, the positions have attracted and held men' whose ability
and fairness have been recognized by the bar and the public. Where the opposite
has happened, progressive decline has occurred.
This is the heart of formal administrative adjudication. It cannot succeed without
competent and well-paid men exercising functions of responsibility and interest.'
The Committee then went on to recommend a highly structured system
of "hearing commissioners," to be appointed by a newly created Office of
Federal Administrative Procedure, for seven-year terms (subject to a one-
year "provisional appointment"), with "substantial" but tiered salaries.
(Agencies that "deal with many small cases" could request permission from
the Office to pay the lower salary.)6
It is striking that the Committee's report, recommendation and draft bill
focused so heavily and almost exclusively on the need to establish a system
of hearing commissioners to handle all on-the-record adjudications. The
full Committee's recommendations on hearing procedures were much less
prescriptive. Title III ("Administrative Adjudication") of the proposed bill7
almost completely revolves around the hearing commissioners' status,
powers, and duties. In the interest of maintaining flexibility, the majority
of the Committee eschewed a proposed code of administrative procedures,
preferring instead to rely on the creation of the hearing commissioner
system and on the proposed new Office of Federal Administrative
Procedure to provide additional uniformity.' However, three (ultimately
3. Id. at 44-45.
4. The use of **men" is a sign of the times, but see Crittenden. infra note 44.
5. AttorneyGeneral's Comm. Report, S. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong.. Ist Sess. 46 (1941).
6. Id. at 46.
7. Id. at 192-202 (including proposed bill).
8. See id. at 191-92 (providing "-prefatory explanation to the bill").
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influential) Commissioners felt strongly enough about the need for more
prescriptive and uniform procedures that they departed from the majority
and went so far as to draft a "code of standards of fair procedure."9
The APA, of course, ultimately reflected both points of view-a heavy
reliance on a system of "hearing examiners" (now "administrative law
judges") and a rather prescriptive (albeit not inflexible) set of formal
hearing procedures, reflected in Sections 5, 7, and 8 of the APA (now 5
U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, and 557).0
Congress passed the APA without dissent." This was quite an
achievement for the drafters, given the acrimony that had surrounded the
previously vetoed Walter-Logan Bill. It was the introduction of that bill,
which attempted to codify the American Bar Association's then strongly
held antipathy to agency decisionmaking, that had led President Roosevelt
to create the blue-ribbon Attorney General's Committee. The unanimity
evidenced the achievement of a workable compromise. As Attorney
General Tom Clark recognized in his comment on the Senate bill, there was
a need to "deal horizontally with the subject of administrative procedure,
so as to overcome the confusion which inevitably has resulted from leaving
to basic agency statutes the prescription of the procedures to be followed,
or in many instances, the delegation of authority to agencies to prescribe
their own procedures."' 2 On the other hand, he also noted that previous
9. See Additional Views and Recommendations of Messrs. McFarland, Stason, and
Vanderbilt, in Attorney General's Comm. Report, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1 st Sess. 203
(1 94 1), which urged the adoption of"legislative standards of fair procedure," id. at 213, and
proposed the text as well, id. at 217. The differences among Committee members are
described in Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA.
L. REV. 219 (1986). See also Present at the Creation: RegulatoryReform Before 1946, 38
ADMIN. L. REV. 511 (1986) (reflections of Professor GelIhorn and Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis, who were on the staff of Attorney General's Committee).
10. See Daniel J. Gifford. Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an
Alternative Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 979 (1991). The Office of
Federal Administrative Procedure was not created. Instead the functions of overseeing the
hearing examiner program fell to the Civil Service Commission, now the Office of Personnel
Management. For a detailed historical account, see LLOYD D. MUSOLF, FEDERAL
EXAMINERS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 139-72 (Greenwood Press
1979) (1953).
11. See Gellhorn, supra note 9, at 231-32.
12. Letter from Tom C. Clark, Attorney General, to Senator Pat McCarran (Oct. 19,
1945), reprinted in ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., FED. ADMIN. PROC. SOURCEBOOK 189-91
(1992).
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bills had failed because, "in their zeal for simplicity and uniformity, they
propose too narrow and rigid a mold."' 3
It is the thesis of this essay that this successful quest for flexible
uniformity is in danger of coming apart. Others have written about the
more topical threats to the APA's rulemaking provisions posed by pending
regulatory "reform" legislation.' " I would suggest that the uniformity and
integrity provided by the APA's formal adjudication provisions are also
threatened, but by a kind of neglect that has led to erosion, circumvention,
and avoidance of the very adjudication procedure that was the APA's
centerpiece.
II. EVOLUTION OF APA ADJUDICATION IN PRACTICE
The first years of the hearing examiner program were not without
controversy, with a politically tinged "fiasco," largely involving the
selection of examiners at the National Labor Relations Board."' But once
the selection process was regularized, the program administered by the Civil
Service Commission began to grow. The number of hearing examiners
grew steadily from 196 in June 1947 to 278 in June 1954, 494 in July
1962, and 792 in February 1974.16
With this growth there also began to be a broadening of the use of
hearing examiners. At first they were used primarily in economic reg-
ulatory programs administered by the independent regulatory agencies. In
fact, apart from the NLRB's unfair labor practice cases, which have always
been quite adversarial, most hearing examiners at the outset were assigned
to licensing cases-in which policy issues were paramount and in which the
presiding examiners often issued recommended decisions (which cannot
13. Id. Attorney General Clark also recognized the special effort taken to "'reconcile"
the views expressed by the proponents and the affected government agencies. Id.
14. See Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Procedure Legislation in 1946 and 1996:
Should We Be Jubilant at this Jubilee?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 55 (1996).
15. The "fiasco" concerned the initial disqualification of incumbent NLRB examiners
for the new position. A special rating board disqualified and downrated most of them
amidst charges that conservatives were engineering a housecleaning. After lawsuits were
brought, nearly all were re-rated and found qualified. See Ralph Fuchs, The Hearing
Examiner Fiasco under the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 HARV. L. REV. 738 (1950);
Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco-A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 57 (1979).
16. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, FederalAgencyAdjudications: Trying to See the Forest and
the Trees, 31 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 383 (1984).
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become final without further agency review) as opposed to initial decisions. 7
This began to change in the 1960's, when the first wedge of benefits
cases heard by hearing examiners at the Social Security Administration
(SSA) began to widen,'8 and in the 1970's and 1980's, when civil penalty
cases began to be assigned to the newly renamed "administrative law
judges" (ALJs). Indeed the name change-which was not without con-
troversy'9 was in part fueled by the recognition that the actual role of the
hearing officers was becoming more judge-like.
This name-change along with the influx of benefits and enforcement
cases, both of which are more fact-bound and more likely to be reviewed
by special quasi-independent appeal boards,2" tended to change the role
and self-perception of ALJs.
The term "hearing examiner," which connotes more of a bureaucratic
role than a judicial role, was first phased out by a Civil Service Commis-
sion regulation in 1972, and the APA was finally amended to substitute
"administrative law judge" in 1978." The transformation from bureaucrat-
ic adviser to judge was something for which the ALJ community fought
long and hard for. This fight was aided by the rapid growth of the Social
Security Administration's ALJ cadre. The political power of ALJ
organizations was markedly increased by having a thousand SSA judges
located in numerous congressional districts. This effort, replete with a paid
lobbyist who was a former member of Congress, culminated in legislation
that raised ALJ pay to the level of the Senior Executive Service (SES) (but
exempted them from the SES performance appraisal system), eliminated the
grade differential between SSA ALJs and others, and arguably cemented
17. Id. at 383-85.
18. The enactment of the SSA disability coverage provisions in 1956 and of the
supplemental security income program in 1972 dramatically increased the need for
adjudicators. See Paul R. Verkuil et al., The FederalAdministrativeJudiciary-Reportfor
Recommendation92-7, 1992 ACUS RECOMMENDATIONS & REPORTS 770, 820 [hereinafter
The Federal Administrative Judiciary].
19. In 1969, a committee of the Administrative Conference of the United States
proposed changing the name to "Administrative Chancellor," but the proposal was not
adopted. See Robert E. Park, Report of the Committee on Personnel in Support of
RecommendationNo. 17, inACUS RECOMMENDATIONS & REPORTS 1968-1970 381,382-89.
See also Views of the Council on the Recommendation of the Committee on Personnel, id.
at 380.
20. For example, initial decisions in SSA benefit cases are reviewed by the SSA
Appeals Council, decisions in Department of Labor black lung benefit cases by a
departmental Benefits Review Board, and decisions in OSHA civil penalty cases heard and
reviewed in the independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.
21. The Federal AdministrativeJudiciary, supra note 18, at 803 n.93.
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the ALJ's special status in the government and legal communities. But at
what price?
III. THE DRIFT AWAY FROM ALJS
A look at the number of ALJs in the federal government shows a
tremendous increase since 1947-from 196 to 1,333 in March 1996. Most
of this increase, however, occurred between 1947 and October 1982, when
the number was 1,183. Since then, the number has increased only 11.3
percent in 14 years. Moreover, all of the growth has been in the Social
Security Administration. In 1947, only 13 of 196 (6.6 percent) were in the
SSA. In 1978, the number had jumped to 660 of 1,071 (61.6 percent); in
1984, 760 of 1,121 (67.8 percent); and today, 1,060 of 1,333 (79.5
percent). Since 1978, in fact, there has been a steady decline in the number
of non-SSA ALJs-from 410 to 361 in 1984 and 273 in 1996. Factor in
the other two largest employers of ALJs, the NLRB and the Department of
Labor, and the decline of the govemment-wide use of ALJs is even more
apparent. Apart from the big three agencies, there were 170 ALJs in other
agencies in 1984; now there are 155.22 And as of March 1996, the
number of ALJs working for economic regulatory agencies had declined to
3.3 percent.23
To some extent, of course, this decrease reflects the effect of deregula-
tion-the elimination of agencies like the CAB and ICC. But the number
of agencies and departments employing ALJs has stayed about the same
(approximately 30) since 1978. What is striking is how few ALJs are
employed by most administrative and regulatory agencies. For example,
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, HUD, and Justice
have only 4, 1, 1, 5, and 6 ALJs, respectively. The Departments of
Defense, State, and Veterans Affairs have none. The five bank regulatory
agencies share 2; major adjudicatory and enforcement agencies like the
CFTC, FTC, ITC, MSPB, and SBA have I or 2 each; and the CPSC,
EEOC, NRC, and Postal Rate Commission have none.
This is not because agencies have stopped adjudicating. They have just
limited their reliance on ALJs. "Non-ALJ adjudicators" are sprouting faster
than tulips in Holland. Nearly three thousand such officials are deciding
cases every day, and the number is growing. John Frye's study, using 1989
22. The figures in this and the next paragraph were previously collected by the author
and were included in Lubbers, supra note 16, at 383-85. The most recent figures were
supplied by the OPM on March 1, 1996 (on file with author).
23. These include the 44judges at the CFTC, EPA, FCC, FERC, FMC, FTC, SEC, and
the Office of Financial Institution Adjudication.
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data gathered by the Administrative Conference,24 identified 2,692 non-
ALJ adjudicators along with others not counted.25
Their numbers have surely grown since then with the rapid growth in
immigration and asylum judges26 and the Agriculture Department's newly
created National Appeals Division (NAD). 27  The Department of Justice
now relies on about 200 immigration judges28 and 260 asylum officers, 29
and the NAD is staffed with about 80 "hearing officers" across the country
to hear appeals from departmental actions.3 °
In addition, there are numerous other large groupings of "administrative
judges" (AJs). There are about 80 AJs who serve on Boards of Contract
Appeals in about a dozen agencies." The Department of Commerce
employs over 50 administrative patent judges and administrative trademark
judges; 2 the Defense Department uses hundreds of hearing officers (but
no ALJs);3 3 and the Department of Veterans Affairs has a 55-member
Board of Veterans Appeals (but no ALJs). 34 The MSPB has 55 adminis-
trative judges that hear federal employee appeals (and I ALJ);" the EEOC
uses some 95 to 100 AJs (but no ALJs);36 and the NRC uses 11 full-time
24. John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the Federal Government,
44 ADMIN. L. REv. 261 (1992).
25. Id. at 349-52 app. B.
26. See The Federal Administrative Judiciary, supra note 18, at 931-50, for a
description of their cases.
27. NAD was created by Pub. L. No. 103-354 (Title II) §§ 271-281 (Oct. 13, 1994);
7 U.S.C.A. §§ 6991-7001 (West Supp. 1996). See 7 C.F.R. Part 11 (1995).
28. Telephone call to Office of Chief Immigration Judge (Apr. 5. 1996). As recently
as February 1992, there were only 88 immigration judges. See The FederalAdministrative
Judiciary, supra note 18, at 852.
29. Telephone call to Asylum Branch, INS (Apr. 5, 1996). These positions were
created in 1990; as of April 1991, there were 120 asylum officers. See The Federal
Administrative Judiciary, supra note 18, at 853.
30. Conversations with Fred Young, Deputy Director, NAD (March 1996).
31. See Frye, supra note 24, at 349.
32. Their names are listed in LEADERSHIP DIRECTORIES, INC., FED. YELLOW BOOK 11-
97 (Winter 1996).
33. See Frye, supra note 24, 349-52 app. B.
34. Telephone call to the Board of Veterans Appeals (Apr. 5. 1996).
35. Telephone call to Office of Chief Clerk, MSPB (Apr. 5, 1996). This number is
down from 66 in 1989. See The FederalAdministrative Judiciary, supra note 18, at 859.
36. Telephone call to Robert L. Walker, Director, Complaint Adjudication Division,
EEOC (Apr. 5, 1996). The Frye study, supra note 24, reported 79 EEOC AJs in 1989.
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and 22 part-time Atomic and Safety Licensing Board members (and,
currently, no ALJs)."
Congress has even gone so far as to approve the use of non-ALJ
adjudicators and non-APA procedures in the assessment of agency civil
penalties. 8 Debarment and suspension of government contractors and
grantees also continue to be heard and decided by non-ALJ adjudicators. 9
In short, the initial trial level in federal agency adjudication is becoming
almost as variegated as the agency appellate structures-which have always
been "unregulated" by the APA.40
IV REASONS FOR THE DRIFT
Why has this occurred? Why have most agencies (with congressional
endorsement) voted with their feet by running away from the ALJ
program? In my opinion, it is because of a perception that, compared to
non-ALJ adjudicators, ALJs are less desirable because of their cost,
restrictions on their selection, and their effective immunity from perfor-
mance management.
A. Cost Considerations
ALJs' salaries range from $75,205 to $115,700, but after 6 years, most
have reached the level of $104,130. 4 1 On the other hand, most AJs are
paid in the GS-12 to GS-15 range ($41,104 to $88,326).2
37. E-mail from William J. Olmstead, Associate General Counsel for Licensing and
Regulation, NRC (Apr. 5, 1996).
38. William F. Funk, Close Enough for Government Work?: Using InformalProcedures
for Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1993).
39. Brian D. Shannon, Debarment and Suspension Revisited: Fewer Eggs in the
Basket?. 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 363 (1995).
40. See Russell L. Weaver, Appellate Review in Executive Departments and Agencies,
48 ADMIN. L. REV. 251 (1996).
41. See 5 U.S.C. § 5372a(a) (1994). ALJ pay is keyed to Executive Level III salary
($115,700 as of Jan. 1. 1995). See Exec. Order No. 12,944. 60 Fed. Reg. 309 (1995),
reprinted in notes to 5 U.S.C.A. § 5332 (West Supp. 1996).
42. See Frye, supra note 24, at 349-52. The range given is from GS-12 (step I) to GS-
15 (step 10). See Exec. Order No. 12,994, supra note 41.
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B. Selection Difficulties
It is very difficult for agencies to hire the applicant (or even the type of
applicant) they want for an AU position.43 The strict provisions of the
competitive civil service, as historically applied to AU hiring, require
agencies to select from a register of candidates served up by the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM). The ranking process for the register highly
values litigating experience (without sufficiently distinguishing between
types of litigators) and service as a veteran, while giving short shrift to
special expertise and diversity values. This means that an agency seeking
a judge with an economics or social services background, for example,
cannot hire one from the register unless such a person happens to be at the
top of the list. It also means that women (who tend to lack veterans'
preference points) have become very underrepresented in the AU corps.4"
Contrast these hurdles with the ease with which an agency can typically
hire lawyers-including lawyers who serve as non-AU adjudicators.
Because lawyers are in the "excepted" service, they can be hired by
agencies almost as readily as they are by private-sector firms.4S
C. Management Issues
ALJs are exempt by statute and by OPM regulation from both the first-
year probationary period and the performance ratings that are applied to
most other federal employees.46 AJs on the other hand, typically can be
made subject to performance measures. Although the APA does provide
a process for disciplining or removing ALJs "for cause," a series of
decisions by the MSPB makes it difficult for agencies to successfully bring
complaints against ALJs for lack of productivity.47
Agency managers obviously have great incentive to opt for using hearing
officers who can be selected strategically, who are easier to manage, and
43. See The- Federal AdministrativeJudiciary, supra note 18, at 931-50, for a detailed
description of the ALJ selection process.
44. Paul R. Verkuil et al., The Federal Administrative Judiciary, 1992 ACUS
RECOMMENDATIONS & REPoRTS 770, 960-64. See also Ann Crittenden, Quotas for Good
Old Boys, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1995, op-ed page.
45. See The FederalAdministrativeJudiciary, supra note 18, at 931-50, for a detailed
description of the selection processes for non-ALJ adjudicators.
46. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an
Appropriate System of Performance Evaluationfor ALs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 589. 590,
592 (1993/1994).
47. Id. at 595-600.
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who can be procured at bargain rates. Is it any wonder that the ALJ
(outside of the SSA with its burgeoning caseload due to the graying of
America) is becoming an endangered species? And what is the outlook for
the 80 percent of the ALJs at the SSA? Already there are indications that
the new SSA is looking for ways to reduce its dependence on ALL.48
V THE NEED TO REDIRECT REFORM EFFORTS
Surprisingly little attention is being paid to the issues of whether, and to
what extent, this tide of balkanization and antipathy toward using ALJs
should be stemmed.49 Unlike the last major legislative attempt to amend
the APA that occurred from 1979 to 1981,0 none of the leading regulatory
reform bills addresses agency adjudication."3 Various bills address the
particular wish lists of specific groups of non-ALJ adjudicators. Immigra-
tion judges, 2 MSPB AJs,"3 and DVA AJs 4 have all promoted legislation
to increase their pay and status (although none of these bills has proposed
making them ALJs). But the only major legislation to address ALJs and
APA adjudication in recent years is the "ALJ Corps" bill that (in various
iterations) has received serious consideration for over 15 years. 5
This legislation would extract the ALJs out of their employing agencies
and locate them in a new agency that would be headed by a presidentially
appointed Chief ALJ. Agencies that need an ALJ would have one assigned
48. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PUB. No. 01-005, PLAN FOR A NEW
DISABILITY CLAIM PROCESS (September 1994). The description of the proposed new
"'administrative appeals process" (at pp. 33-34) includes the use of an -adjudication officer"
who will handle the initial aspects of the case for the ALJ and who will have full authority
to grant (but not deny) claims. While apparently intended to be a subordinate assistant to
the ALJ, it is not difficult to envision that greater reliance on adjudication officers might
reduce the number of ALJs at the SSA.
49. One would think, for example, that the various ALJ organizations would be quite
concerned about the welfare of "future generations of ALJs." See Brian C. Griffin & Gary
J. Edles, An Alternate Look at the Administrative Conference s Recommendations on the
Administrative Judiciary. 32 JUDGES' J. 38, 39 (1993) ("Clearly this [growth in non-ALJ
adjudicators] is (or should be) a concern shared by ALJs.").
50. See Scalia, supra note 15. The first sentence of then-Professor Scalia's article is
"'The subject of administrative hearing officers is once again on the agenda of federal
regulatory reform." Id.
51. Levin, supra note 15.
52. The Federal AdministrativeJudiciary, supra note 18, at 856 nn.317-18.
53. Id. at 860 n.349.
54. Id. at 865 n.99.
55. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALJs: A Proposal to Test the Idea at
the Federal Level, 63 JUDICATURE 266 (1981).
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by the Corps. The newer versions of the bill have sought to address agency
concerns by dividing the Corps into specialized panels, creating a complaint
handling board, allowing the Chief ALJ to be selected from managerial
ranks, and capping the Corps's budget. 6 Nevertheless, the bill remains
controversial and has its fervent supporters and detractors. 7
While I see some merit in the latest versions of the proposal and believe
that the model has worked well in some states, 8 I do not think the
legislation is the answer to the problems sketched out above. For one
thing, the sponsors have never come to grips with the reality that 80 percent
of the Corps would serve in the SSA panel. And SSA benefit cas-
es-typically brief, nonadversarial hearings without government counsel
involved-are distinctly different from most of the other cases that would
be heard by the Corps. 9
More fundamentally, enactment of the Corps bill would make agencies
even less inclined to go the APA/ALJ route. At least agencies now know
that cases assigned to ALJs are assigned to their own ALJs-who are
presumably expert in the agency's programs. If agencies had less
confidence in the expertise of Corps ALJs and even less say in their
56. See S. 486; H.R. 1802, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995). The House bill was
approved by the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law on September 14.
1995. No committee action has taken place in the Senate on the identical Senate bill as of
this writing. The Clinton Administration, while not taking a position on S. 486, transmitted
specifications of a "supportable bill" to "reorganiz[e] the Federal Administrative Judiciary."
It suggested retaining ALJs within their employing agencies but under the administrative
control of a new "Administrative Office for the ALJ Corps." The specifications also
endorsed opening up the selection process and creating a"Complaint and Resolution Board.**
Letter from Lloyd D. Cutler, Special Counsel to the President, to Senator Howell Heflin
(Aug. 24, 1994) (Attachment I).
57. Indeed, there is now division within the ranks of the Federal Administrative Law
Judges Conference (FALJC), which in prior years had been in the forefront of support for
the Corps bill. In 1994, the Executive Committee of the FALJC voted not to endorse S.
486, which had passed the Senate in 1993. H.R. 1802, as introduced in the 104th Congress,
was identical to S. 486. See Letter from William Pope, President, FALJC, to FALJC
membership (July 24, 1995) (on file with author). The main points of disagreement were
with (1) the selection process for the chief and division chief judges, (2) the chief judge's
power to order transfers and reductions in force, and (3) the restrictive appropriations cap.
58. See John W. Hardwicke, The Central Hearing Agency: Theory and Implementation
in Maryland, 14 J. NAT'L Ass'N OF AL:s 3. 84-89 (1994). Judge Hardwicke reports that
16 states and New York City use some form of a central panel system for hearing officers.
Id.
59. See generally Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the
Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social SecurityAdministration 'sAppeals
Council, 17 FLA. ST. L. REV. 199 (1990).
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selection.than they do now, wouldn't agencies also tend to work harder to
avoid APA/ALJ hearings than they do under the current flawed system?
Therefore, I do not believe the Corps bill is the cure for what ails the
current federal administrative adjudicative system. Rather I would suggest
a new reform agenda designed to return to a more ordered and consistent
approach to formal administrative adjudication across the government.
VI. AGENDA FOR REFORM
The basic purpose of the following proposals is to reinvigorate the
demand among agencies and their congressional overseers and patrons for
using ALJs. This requires making ALJs more cost-effective by reducing
their monetary and managerial costs and by increasing the perceived value
of their work product. I am pursuing this because I think highly skilled,
independent, bureaucratically separate, specialized, highly regarded ad-
ministrative judges are a crucial linchpin of our system of administration. -
I believe the 1941 Attorney General's Committee's vision of a uniform
professional cadre of such officers was a good one and I would like to see
us return to it. To those ends, I suggest the following steps be taken:
A. Establish an Administrative Office for Agency Adjudication
Such an office-similar to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
and to the original Attorney General's Committee proposal for an Office of
Fair Administrative Procedure-would bring a higher level of attention to
the ALJ system than has been possible through the years by the chronically
understaffed, low-profile Office of Administrative Law Judges in OPM.
B. Return to a Multi-iered Corps of ALJs
The Attorney General's Committee originally suggested a two-level
structure, allowing agencies with a high volume of small cases to seek
permission from the Office of Fair Administrative Procedure to use the
.lower salary level. The APA's implementation went even further. As then-
Professor Scalia, pointed out in 1979, "As late as 1953, the 294 APA
hearing examiners were distributed broadly among five grade levels from
60. Without them. we might perhaps be better off emulating the Australian system by
having agency actions reviewable in one or more Administrative Appeals Tribunals, with
judicial review on legal matters available in federal court. See Kim Rubenstein, An Outline
of Australian Administrative Law (paper delivered at American Bar Association Symposium,
Feb. 2. 1996) (on file with author).
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GS-11 to GS-15."' He went on to call "for a return to a multi-grade
structure." 2
Instead the ALJ organizations persuaded Congress to go the other way
and do away with the remaining two-step (GS-15/GS-16) division between
"benefits" judges (primarily SSA judges) and the other "regulatory"
judges.63 The current salary provisions retain this unitary model by
providing for automatic step increases for seniority and a higher grade only
for chief judges.64 I agree with Justice Scalia, and would reverse this
trend. I would permit agencies the leeway to seek permission to create
categories of ALJs on a much wider salary range-say from GS-12 to the
SES. The title of ALJ (along with the protections and status it affords)
would continue, and the wider salary range would afford agencies and
applicants more flexibility while also creating a real career path for aspiring
administrative judges.
C. Introduce More Flexibility into the Selection Process
Ideally, the hiring process for ALJs should be removed from the tight
strictures of the civil service selection process, as is the current process for
hiring federal lawyers, now generally applicable to non-lawyers, so that a
more flexible system of merit selection can be devised. I would retain a
screening step (perhaps by the new Administrative Office) but would allow
agencies much greater leeway to choose from among pre-screened qualified
applicants. If the current basic system is maintained, the certificates
presented to agencies should be enlarged, veterans preference for this
position should be reduced or eliminated, and the ranking process should
give greater weight to specialized experience." A probationary period
should also be considered.66
61. Scalia, supra note 15, at 62.
62. Id. at 75.
63. Pub. L. No. 101-509, Title V. § 529. 104 Stat. 1445 (Nov. 5, 1990). See also
supra note 41.
64. See 5 U.S.C: § 5372a(a) (1994). But as of March 1996, only 38 of the 1,333 were
in the higher pay categories reserved for managers. See supra note 22.
65. The Federal Administrative Judiciary, supra note 18, at 954-66. Also, see the
formal recommendation of the Administrative Conference, ACUS Recommendation 92-7.
1 C.F.R. § 305.92-7 (Part 11) (1993), 57 Fed. Reg. 61,760 (Dec. 29, 1992), reprinted in
Lubbers, supra note 46, at 613-38.
66. This option for the agencies was recommended by the Attorney General's
Committee Report, supra note 2. Such a probationary period is required for other
employees selected from registers or promoted to managerial positions. 5 U.S.C. § 3321
(1994); 5 C.F.R. § 2.4 (1995).
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D. Allow Peer-Review Based Evaluation
As I have suggested before,67 the current prohibitions of performance
appraisals and ratings should be eliminated and a system of peer review,
supervised by chief ALJs, should be established. Many federal and state
courts have established judicial evaluation programs, and ALJs in a large
number of states are also subject to performance evaluation. Such a system
should be feasible and consistent with judicial independence values in the
federal AU program as well.
E. Maintain Other Key APA Protections of ALU Independence
ALJs should continue to be located in organizationally distinct offices;
they should not be assigned any extra-judicial duties; and the "for cause"
disciplinary hearing process at MSPB should be retained.6"
F Encourage Experimentation with Pools or "Minicorps"
One of the attractive arguments for the AU Corps bill, is its potential to
introduce economies of scale into programs with a small number of ALJs.
The banking agencies have already established such a pool, and there are
other agencies (i.e., trade agencies, business-related agencies) that might
benefit from such an arrangement.
G. Give ALJs More Authority
Agency heads should be encouraged to delegate more decisional
authority to ALJs-through self- or legislatively imposed limitations on
agency review. The need for political control of agency adjudication
diminishes in high-volume, fact-based enforcement and benefit adjudica-
tions.69 AU decisions should ordinarily speak for the agency, except in
rare cases where a new major policy issue is involved or where the AL's
fealty to established law and policy is questioned.
More courtroom authority is also needed. In this day of metal detectors
in courtrooms, ALJs need more authority to control hearings. This should
67. Lubbers. supra note 46, at 603-07. See also ACUS Recommendation 92-7, supra
note 66, at pt. IIl.
68. MSPB should, however, assign such cases to ALJs drawn from a pool. See ACUS
Recommendation 92-7, supra note 65, at pt. III(E). The addition of peer-review based
performance evaluation would inform this process, when necessary.
69. See Gifford, supra note 10.
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include more power to sanction disruptive or frivolous behavior and more
authority to reject duplicative or irrelevant evidence.
H. Increase Opportunities for Training and Continuing Legal
Education
A professional group of judges requires initial and periodic training in
legal, technical, and information resources management issues. Few
agencies can afford either initial or periodic training at present. This is
penny-wise and pound-foolish.
L Enlarge the Role of ALJs in ADR
A few years ago, we used to say that ADR was the "wave of the future."
But it is here today, and many agencies have developed ADR programs
using mediators and other outside "neutrals."7  With appropriate safe-
guards, ALJs can and should serve as neutrals in settlement judge
programs, minitrials, and even negotiated rulemaking.
J Mandate the Use of ALJs
The Administrative Conference has already suggested that, even under
current circumstances, Congress should take pains to ensure that certain
types of cases be heard by ALJs.7" If all or most of the foregoing nine
recommendations are acted upon, it will be feasible for Congress to
mandate that most agency formal hearing be conducted by ALJs. This
would mean converting many of the current AJ positions to ALJ positions.
CONCLUSION
The current decline in agency use of administrative law judges to
conduct formal adjudications poses a threat to the uniformity and
consistency of administrative decisionmaking procedure envisioned by the
framers of the APA. To reverse this trend, regulatory reformers need to
70. ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., TOWARD IMPROVED AGENCY DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
IMPLEMENTING THE ADR ACT (Feb. 1995).
71. These include those cases likely to involve:
a. substantial impact on personal liberties or freedom;
b. orders that carry with them a finding of criminal-like culpability;
c. imposition of sanctions with substantial economic effect: or
d. determination of discrimination under civil rights or other analogous laws.
ACUS Recommendation 92-7, supra note 65, at pt. 1.
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refocus their attention on the issue and sponsor a series of interrelated
improvements to the ALJ program.
